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FIFTH AMENDMENT
When Can the Government's
Misrepresentations Give Rise
to a Constitutional Tort?
by Antonio F. Perez
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 307-311. 0 2002 American Bar Association.
ISSUES
Can allegations that senior State
Department and National Security
Council officials failed to inform a
U.S. citizen that her foreign citizen
husband was in foreign custody suf-
fice to allege a denial of access to
the courts in violation of the Fifth
Amendment so as to give rise to a
constitutional tort even absent any
allegation that the plaintiff tried to
file a lawsuit or was actually hin-
dered in doing so?
If so, was that right clearly
established as of the time of the
government officials' conduct so
as to defeat a defense of qualified
immunity?
FACTS
Jennifer Harbury, the respondent in
this case, is an American citizen
and the widow of Efrain Bamaca-
Velazquez, a Guatemalan citizen
and high-ranking commander of a
Guatemalan rebel group. After
Bamaca-Velazquez vanished on
March 12, 1992, and despite
Guatemalan army claims that he
had committed suicide during an
armed skirmish, Harbury allegedly
learned in early 1993 from an
escaped prisoner that her husband
was alive, in Guatemalan army cus-
tody, and being tortured.
She alleges that she contacted State
Department officials in March 1993
and sought their assistance, and
that they in turn promised to look
into the matter. The State
Department never supplied any
information, she alleges, although it
is now clear that it was aware that
Bamaca-Velazquez was in the cus-
tody of members of the Guatemalan
military, which included paid CIA
informants. Indeed, she alleges that
in August of that year she obtained
permission to exhume a body from
a grave erroneously thought to be
that of her husband, which she then
reported to the State Department,
which again indicated it would
investigate and keep her informed.
(Continued on Page 308)
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It is alleged that Bamaca-Velazquez
was executed sometime between
March and September of 1993.
Between October 1993 and October
1994, Harbury met repeatedly with
State Department officials, who she
says assured her that they were
looking into the matter and that the
Guatemalan military had assured
them that they did not have and
had never had custody of Bamaca-
Velazquez. Prompted in part by
Harbury's 32-day hunger strike in
Guatemala City, the CBS news pro-
gram 60 Minutes investigated and in
October 1994 reported that the U.S.
embassy in Guatemala had received
an intelligence report indicating
that Bamaca-Velzquez had been
captured alive. Only then did the
State Department publicly confirm
his capture while still indicating
that it had no independent evidence
concerning whether he was alive.
Shortly thereafter, Harbury met
with National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake, who told her the
government had "scraped the bot-
tom of the barrel" for further infor-
mation about her husband, but to
no avail. Nonetheless, in January
1995, Harbury filed a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request.
She did not, however, receive any
documents until after she filed two
lawsuits in federal court to press
those FOIA requests. See Harbury
v. CIA, No. 95-CV-1431 (D.D.C. filed
July 31, 1995; stipulation of dis-
missal filed Jan. 28, 1999); Harbury
v. Department of State, et al., No.
97-CV-305 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 14,
1997; stipulation of dismissal filed
Jan. 28, 1999). The government
now appears to concede that many
of those documents could have been
declassified and made available at
the time of the initial FOIA
requests. In March 1995, after being
told by State Department and NSC
officials that her husband was prob-
ably dead because so much time
had passed, Harbury began another
hunger strike. At this point, Con-
gressman Bob Torricelli announced
publicly that Bamaca-Velazquez had
been murdered at the direction of a
Guatemalan army officer who had
also been a paid CIA informant.
Harbury filed suit in 1996, claiming
that the State Department and
National Security Council (NSC)
officials knowingly failed to alert her
to the true state of affairs for the
purpose and with the effect of delay-
ing her from filing suit and thereby
abridging her constitutional right of
access to the courts. She asserts
that the misrepresentations by the
individuals named in her complaint,
including the secretary of state and
national security adviser, in effect
prevented her from seeking judicial
relief that might have prevented her
husband's execution or continued
torture. She also asserts that if the
government had not misled her, she
might have been able to obtain doc-
uments earlier by commencing an
action under the Freedom of
Information Act and might have
been able to seek the assistance of
Congress.
Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)(establishing a constitutional
tort remedy of money damages for
violation of Fourth Amendment
rights), Harbury asserted that the
officials named in her complaint
had committed a constitutional
tort entitling her to an award of
damages.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly of the D.C.
Circuit dismissed Harbury's Bivens
claim that sought damages for the
alleged violations of her constitu-
tional rights but allowed Harbury's
additional claims against the federal
government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) to proceed. (To
the extent those claims proceed on
the basis of a misrepresentation the-
ory, however, they may well fail
under the FTCA's "misrepresenta-
tion exception," which provides that
the United States's waiver of sover-
eign immunity does not apply to
"any claim arising out of ... misrep-
resentation." 28 USC § 2860(h).)
Judge Kollar-Kotelly held that
Harbury's denial of access-to-courts
claim foundered on her failure to
allege any actual attempt on her
part to file suit, and, in the alterna-
tive, that this Bivens action was
defeated by the qualified immunity
accorded government officials when,
as here, the asserted constitutional
right was not clearly established law
at the time of the alleged constitu-
tional violation.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit (Judges Edwards, Ginsburg,
and Tatel) reversed the dismissal of
the Bivens claim. The panel assert-
ed that government misrepresenta-
tion could have impaired Harbury's
ability to pursue effective injunctive
relief along the lines described in
her complaint, and it specifically
rejected the so-called exhaustion
requirement-that is, the argument
that she should have made an effort
to actually file suit-because the
potential for irreparable harm from
the government's conduct rendered
the exhaustion requirement inap-
plicable. The panel also rejected the
government's qualified immunity
defense, reasoning from prior cases
that qualified immunity is unavail-
able in cases in which the plaintiff
was "affirmatively misled" by gov-
ernment officials.
The court of appeals recognized that
its holding may be in conflict with
the decisions of the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, which have imposed an
exhaustion requirement on consti-
tutional torts grounded on denial of
access to courts. See Swekel v. City
of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259 (6th
Issue No. 6308
Cir. 1997); and Delew v. Wagner,
143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998).
Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit denied
the defendants' petition for rehear-
ing en banc. See Harbury v.
Deutch, 244 F.3d 960 (D.C. Cir.
2001). The Supreme Court granted
the defendants' petition for a writ of
certiorari on December 10, 2001,
and scheduled oral argument for
March 25, 2002.
Harbury has chosen to appear
before the Court as her own coun-
sel, while her former counsel,
Jenner & Block, LLC, has filed an
amicus brief on behalf of the
Brennan Institute for Justice in sup-
port of her position.
CASE ANALYSIS
This case comes to the Supreme
Court in the wake of a series of
recent cases signaling a majority of
the Court's intention to narrow
Bivens cases to their particular
facts. Last term's Correctional
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, for exam-
ple, refused to extend the doctrine
so as to permit an action against an
independent contractor's performing
correctional services, largely
because the contractors would not
benefit from qualified immunity
and, therefore, state law remedies
would still be available. See 122 S.
Ct. 515, 521 (2001). Indeed, in
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979), the only case in which the
Court has found a constitutional,
tort arising from the violation of the
Fifth Amendment's due process
clause, the Supreme Court made
clear that the critical element of the
plaintiff's argument was the absence
of any other remedy for the plain-
tiffs claim against a sitting congress-
man for violation of her rights under
the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause.
Thus, the precise nature of the con-
stitutional right of access to the
courts will be an issue in this case.
If the right to access that Harbury
seeks to vindicate is premised on
the assertion of claims for monetary
relief against government officials in
their individual capacity, then the
qualified immunity of these officials
may well bring her claim within the
central rationale of Bivens: that
there is an implied private action
for damages against federal officers
alleged to have violated a citizen's
constitutional rights. However,
Harbury's central claim is that
deception by government officials
prevented (or, perhaps better, dis-
suaded) her from seeking other
kinds of judicial relief, such as an
order enjoining Bamaca-Velazquez's
execution or continued torture, and
that it prevented her from bringing
her FOIA action at an earlier date
and exercising her First Amendment
right to petition the Congress either
directly or through the media.
The petitioners (former Secretary of
State Warren Christopher and other
government officials) argue that
Harbury's right of access to the
courts is grounded primarily on the
possibility that injunctive relief
might have saved her husband's life.
They further argue, as does the U.S.
government as amicus curiae, that
Harbury lacks standing to advance
such a claim. First, even affirmative
misrepresentation by defendants
would not have caused her hus-
band's torture and death. Second,
because a U.S. court would lack
jurisdiction to order the
Guatemalan army not to murder
one of its prisoners, no threatened*
harm to Harbury would be redress-
able through injunctive relief. The
petitioners therefore argue that
since Harbury failed to satisfy the
core constitutional requirements for
standing, any possible "denial of
access" to courts through govern-
ment misrepresentation is in reality
a "blithe skein of conjecture." Brief
for Petitioners, at 30.
To the extent Harbury grounds her
access to courts claim on the right
to seek information alone, the peti-
tioners note that the Court has pre-
viously been reticent to imply con-
stitutional torts to protect interests
when "Congress has provided what
it considers to be adequate remedial
mechanism for constitutional viola-
tions." Zchweiker v. Chilichy, 487
U.S. 412, 423 (1983). The petition-
ers thus reason that the existence of
FOIA counsels against the implica-
tion of a Bivens remedy in this case.
In response, Harbury argues that
the due process clause requires fair
notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Thus, even if causation and
redressability are unclear, she was
nevertheless entitled to a hearing on
her claims and not to be misled into
not pursuing her rights.
If the Court chooses not to resolve
the case on the basis of the unique
features of the kind of relief
Harbury sought, it may confront the
split between the D.C. Circuit, on
the one hand, and the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, on the other, over
whether the right of access to the
courts is predicated on the litigant's
making an initial effort to bring suit.
The nub of Harbury's claim, howev-
er, is that her failure to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement, on the par-
ticular facts of her case, is excused
by governmental misconduct. In a
sense, she argues, the named offi-
cials should be barred (that is,
"estopped") from pleading the
exhaustion requirement. Indeed, the
court of appeals opinion could be
read as carving out an exception to
the exhaustion requirement on the
particular facts of this case, rather
than posing a direct conflict with
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.
The Court, however, may well side-
step these narrower questions in
order to address the fundamental
question raised by this case; that is,
(Continued on Page 310)
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to what degree must the government
cooperate in a citizen's exercise of
her right to access to the courts?
Much of the debate may turn on the
meaning of the Court's precedents.
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1977), the Court extended the
access to courts right to encompass
an inability to pay the required costs
for obtaining a divorce. The Court
has imposed even more onerous
requirements on the government in
the prison context, where the gov-
ernment's control over the prisoner
would otherwise diminish her ability
to exercise her rights vigorously. In
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828
(1977), the Court stated that prison
officials must "assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing j~risoners
with adequate law libraries or ade-
quate assistance from persons
trained in law." However, the Court
later purported to disavow the sug-
gestion that "the State must enable
the prisoner to discover grievances,
and to litigate effectively once in
court." See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 354 (1996)(emphasis in origi-
nal).
It is an open question whether the
Court will analogize Harbury's situa-
tion, because of her limited ability
to seek the truth about her hus-
band's situation and her limited
ability to protect her family from
foreign oppression, to that of prison-
ers who are largely dependent on
the government. If the Court does
make that analogy (or, perhaps, if
the Court finds there was a volun-
tary undertaking by State
Department and NSC officials of a
duty to investigate, through their
oral commitments to Harbury), it
may well be more willing to find a
greater duty for governmental coop-
eration in Harbury's efforts to enlist
the courts' help in saving her hus-
band's life. If so, then the govern-
ment's affirmative misrepresenta-
tions might have operated as a
denial of the kind of assistance or
information that the Bounds Court
believed was a duty of the state to
provide in order to facilitate the
exercise of the constitutional right
to access to the courts. The peti-
tioners and United States are likely
to reiterate the core background
proposition, most recently clarified
in Deshaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs. 489 U.S.189
(1989), that individual rights are
protected from governmental depri-
vation only, and that as a general
matter the government has no duty
to facilitate their exercise.
Moreover, the petitioners and the
United States as amicus curiae con-
tend, even if the Court finds there
was some governmental duty to
cooperate in Harbury's exercise of
her right to access to the courts, the
line between affirmative governmen-
tal misrepresentation and a mere
failure to disclose would be impossi-
ble to draw in this particular factual
context. In substance, petitioners
and the United States contend that
there are circumstances in which
U.S. officials might even be required
to affirmatively deceive U.S. nation-
als in order to protect classified
information, including matters of
the highest national security con-
cern. Moreover, such nonactionable
"nondisclosure" would be indistin-
guishable from affirmative misrepre-
sentation because, in any case in
which classified information needed
to be protected, the government
officials could never in fact choose
to be completely silent in their
interactions with the person seeking
that information and thus any mis-
leading or deceptive communica-
tions on their part might cross the
line Harbury would have the Court
draw. Indeed, a government official's
motive in any case in which classi-
fied information is involved is pre-
cisely to prevent the dissemination
of that information, including
through judicial discovery. In short,
the Court may well find that
Harbury's proposed test is a distinc-
tion without a genuine difference.
On the one hand, Harbury argues
that recognition of a government
official's privilege to lie to American
citizens seeking to exercise their
right to access to courts opens the
door to a parade of horribles. She
even offers a hypothetical case in
which the United States develops a
relationship with groups smuggling
undocumented aliens into the
United States in order to obtain
information about narcotics smug-
gling, and that network engages in
the kidnapping of young American
women for a prostitution network.
She suggests that, under the govern-
ment and petitioners' theory of the
case, U.S. Customs officials could lie
to the children's U.S. parents and
deny them information about their
daughters. Respondents Brief, at 17.
Even if Harbury's own case is distin-
guishable from the hypothetical she
supposes, her larger point will com-
mand the Court's attention: When
do government officials possessing
specific information regarding
threats to the health or safety of
American citizens or their families
have a duty to disclose that infor-
mation? Conversely, what are the
costs of chilling effective govern-
ment handling of information relat-
ing to those kinds of threats?
SIGNIFICANCE
Harbury, while asserting the viola-
tion of her matrimonial rights under
the due process clause, does not
appear to have relied on the govern-
ment's duty under the privileges and
immunities clause to seek to protect
her while she is abroad. See
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (establishing a
federal citizen's right to federal pro-
tection overseas). The right of citi-
zens to the assistance of their gov-
ernment has, in the wake of recent
events, become a more pressing
Issue No. 6310
constitutional concern. That said,
the Court may well be loath in this
time of crisis to do or say anything
that appears to hamstring executive
energy in the war against terrorism.
Qualified immunity ordinarily pro-
tects federal officers from fear that
they will be personally liable for
actions within the 'outer perime-
ter" of their official responsibilities.
One should expect as narrow a
holding as possible in this case,
doing as little damage as possible to
qualified immunity yet leaving the
door open to particularly egregious
cases. While Harbury rightly asserts
that her allegations are to be taken
as true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss, this is clearly not a case in
which government officials directed
her husband's torture and execu-
tion. A war against terrorism may
well require retaining the confi-
dence of some fairly nasty individu-
als. Betraying their secrets may in
the short term protect the rights of
some individual Americans; yet the
Court may well feel it is in no posi-
tion in this case to burden the gov-
ernment's ability to pursue the com-
mon good.
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